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The challenge of dual-use research in
the life sciences emerged vividly in 2011
as scientists and policy-makers debated
what to do about article manuscripts that
described how to modify the H5N1 avian
influenza virus so that it could spread
between mammals (1, 2). Since H5N1
emerged in Southeast Asia in 2003, it
has sickened 667 people and caused 393
human deaths, as well as the deaths of
millions of domestic and wild birds (3).
The virus has not, however, demonstrated
the ability to engage in sustained human-
to-human transmission. If a new strain of
H5N1 emerged with that capability, and it
retained a high level of virulence, it could
cause a global pandemic. The experiments
by Yoshihiro Kawaoka from the University
of Wisconsin-Madison and Ron Fouch-
ier from Erasmus Medical Center in the
Netherlands not only demonstrated that
mammalian transmission of the virus was
possible but also provided information on
how to construct such a virus.
These H5N1 experiments are only
the latest demonstration of the dual-use
dilemma at the heart of the biotechnology
revolution: research conducted for peaceful
purposes has the potential to be misused
for malicious purposes. The H5N1 con-
troversy highlighted the widely divergent
views on the benefits and risks of dual-
use research held by different stakeholders,
including scientists, publishers, biosecurity
experts, the national security community,
and public health officials. On the one
side, proponents of the research focused on
the public health benefits of knowing that
H5N1 can be transmitted between mam-
mals and which specific mutations can con-
fer this ability on the virus. Opponents of
the research highlighted the risks of a lab-
oratory accident and the potential for a
nefarious actor such as a terrorist group or
rogue scientist to replicate the research and
deliberately release the virus.
The concept of wicked problems pro-
vides a new lens for understanding the
public policy challenges posed by dual-
use research. This concept was first intro-
duced in the 1970s to describe the chal-
lenges posed by poverty, urban develop-
ment, and other social issues (4). Wicked
in this context does not mean evil or cool,
but instead refers to the intrinsic proper-
ties of an issue that make it resistant to
long-lasting solutions.
Wicked problems are characterized by
multiple, overlapping subsets of problems
and high levels of social complexity dri-
ven by the number and diversity of play-
ers involved in problem-solving. The par-
ties who have a vested interest in how (or
whether) the problem is solved are likely
to come from different organizations and
disciplines with different values and objec-
tives so they will define the problem and
acceptable solutions differently. The com-
plex interactions between interconnected
issues and the diversity of stakeholder pref-
erences impede the wide acceptance of a
definitive statement of the problem. As
a result, wicked problems tend to defy
traditional linear methods of problem-
solving, which rely on a clear specifica-
tion of the problem to drive the data
collection and analysis process. Further-
more, the environment in which stakehold-
ers are trying to solve a wicked problem is
dynamic. The constraints on the solution,
such as availability of resources and polit-
ical ramifications, change over time, and
stakeholders enter and exit the problem-
solving process, change their preferences,
or otherwise change the rules by which
they address the problem. Since there is
no definitive statement of the problem,
there can be no definitive solution. As a
result, the problem-solving process ends
only when stakeholders run out of time,
money, or energy, not when the perfect
solution emerges. In addition, solutions
to wicked problems are at high risk of
having unanticipated effects. Wicked prob-
lems are never permanently solved since
solutions have implications for other pol-
icy domains, which can generate feedback
loops or have unintended consequences.
The potential for this type of ripple effect
increases the scope of stakeholders affected
directly or indirectly by policy-making and
creates the need for a wider array of infor-
mation from a broader range of sources to
identify the universe of potential solutions
and their costs and benefits. In sum, wicked
problems are “ambiguous, fluid, complex,
political, and frustrating as hell.” [(5): p. 2].
Based on these characteristics, dual-
use research has all of the signs of being
a wicked problem. As two congressional
researchers (6) wrote about the H5N1
controversy:
The current issues under debate cut
across traditional policy areas, involv-
ing simultaneous consideration of
security, scientific, health, export, and
international policy. Because of the
complexity of these issues, analysis
according to one set of policy prior-
ities may adversely affect other policy
priorities (p. 24).
While wicked problems defy easy and
long-lasting solutions, there are several
strategies that can be used to manage
them. The choice of strategy is dictated by
two factors: how concentrated or dispersed
power is among stakeholders and how
strongly stakeholders struggle for power
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Table 1 | Coping strategies for wicked problems.
Power is concentrated Power is dispersed
Power is contested Hegemonic Competitive
Power is not contested Authoritative Collaborative
amongst themselves (5). Based on these
criteria, four coping strategies for wicked
problems can be identified: authoritative,
hegemonic, competitive, and collaborative
(see Table 1).
Stakeholders following an authoritative
strategy cede the authority to define and
solve the problem to a small group of
experts. Reducing the number of stake-
holders involved in decision-making sim-
plifies and speeds up the process. The use of
experts also increases the perceived objec-
tivity, and therefore, legitimacy of the out-
come. A drawback to this strategy is that
even experts can be wrong or have too
narrow of a view (5).
The George W. Bush Administration
initially employed an authoritative strategy
to address dual-use research. In 2002, the
National Academy of Sciences was com-
missioned to provide recommendations for
how to balance the costs and benefits posed
by dual-use research. As a result of this
study, the Bush administration created the
National Science Advisory Board for Biose-
curity (NSABB) to advise the government
on dual-use research oversight. Between
2005 and 2012, NSABB was at the forefront
of dual-use research oversight, education,
and outreach activities.
When one party is so powerful that it is
able to impose its preferred problem defi-
nition and solution on other stakeholders,
it can employ a hegemonic strategy. While
other stakeholders may disagree with the
way a problem is defined or solved, the
hegemonic strategy simply excludes them
from the decision-making process. The
main advantage of this strategy is its speed
and simplicity: problem-solving by decree.
The major disadvantage of this approach
is that it is more likely to try to “tame” a
wicked problem than actually solve it.
In late 2004, spurred by fears that recent
breakthroughs in gene synthesis technol-
ogy could be used to create dangerous
pathogens from scratch, the U.S. Congress
made it illegal to synthesize the variola
virus, which was defined as“a virus that can
cause human smallpox or any derivative of
the variola major virus that contains more
than 85% of the gene sequence” of vari-
ola (7). Scientists objected that the seem-
ingly precise language of the new law could
potentially cripple research on smallpox
vaccine and other orthopoxviruses since all
of these viruses are closely related. This
hegemonic strategy was a heavy-handed
attempt to“tame”the problem posed by the
growing sophistication of synthetic biology
by simply outlawing a specific use of the
technology.
When power is dispersed and con-
tested, stakeholders view problem-solving
as a zero-sum game. Stakeholders pursue
a competitive strategy to consolidate their
own power in order to define the problem
in their preferred way and impose their pre-
ferred solution. This strategy can result in
more innovative policies due to the struggle
by stakeholders to persuade others of their
preferred definition and solution. Another
advantage of this strategy is that it impedes
the centralization of power and creates
opportunities for reform when the balance
of power among stakeholders shifts. A dis-
advantage of this strategy is that it is likely
to end in stalemate as different stakehold-
ers maneuver to implement their preferred
approach and block others from doing
likewise (5). The competitive strategy is
the default setting for resolving wicked
problems in the American political system.
The 2011 controversy over the H5N1
experiments marked a shift from an
authoritative to competitive strategy for
dealing with dual-use research. The debate
over these experiments quickly moved
beyond the NSABB and the small com-
munity of biosecurity specialists to include
the World Health Organization, politi-
cians, scientific publishers, and the sci-
entific community, especially influenza
researchers. In an explicit acceptance that
the scientific authority of the influenza
community was no longer sufficient to
shield it from oversight, Dr. Anthony Fauci,
director of the National Institutes for Aller-
gies and Infectious Disease (NIAID), told
international influenza experts, “The flu
scientific community can no longer be the
only players in the discussion of whether
the experiments should be done.” (8). At
the same time, the NSABB’s charter was
revised to remove its authority to review
dual-use experiments and it has not met
since late 2012 (9).
Collaborative strategies are best suited
for situations where power is dispersed
but not contested. Under these conditions,
stakeholders can move beyond the zero-
sum mentality and work together for“win–
win” outcomes. This strategy seeks to alter
the structure of payoffs to encourage coop-
eration through repeated iterations to build
up trust or create linkages between unre-
lated issues to expand the potential gains
achievable through cooperation. Collabo-
ration can enable stakeholders to achieve
results they would not have been capa-
ble of reaching on their own and to do
so more efficiently. Increasing the num-
ber of stakeholders and seeking solutions
that are acceptable to as many parties as
possible increases transaction costs and
delays decision-making. An additional hur-
dle to collaboration is that each stakeholder
brings practice-based “local knowledge” to
the table, which is hard to share and dif-
ficult for other stakeholders with different
identities to internalize (10). Despite these
disadvantages, a collaborative strategy has
the potential to yield longer lasting poli-
cies that are more widely accepted by the
relevant stakeholders (5).
Unfortunately, people often have to
fail into collaboration. According to
Roberts (5),
People have to learn what does not
work before they are willing to absorb
what they perceive to be the extra
‘costs’ associated with collaboration.
This learning is especially important
for people who come from cultures
that place a high premium on taking
charge, making decisions, being com-
petitive, and using authorities and
experts to settle whatever disputes
arise (p. 12).
Although the authoritative strategy for
addressing the wicked problem posed by
dual-use research has now run its course,
it is unclear what will replace it. The sci-
entific community views the competitive
and hegemonic strategies with a mixture
of fear and contempt: contempt for the
Frontiers in Public Health | Infectious Diseases August 2014 | Volume 2 | Article 113 | 2
Koblentz Dual-use research and wicked problems
push-and-pull of politics that privileges
sound bites over the complexities of science
and fear of draconian solutions imposed
by scientifically ignorant politicians and
bureaucrats.
Successful collaboration on dual-use
research is more likely to emerge if stake-
holders engage in intensive dialog as a
means of building a shared understanding
about the problem and a shared commit-
ment to solving it. Dialog is not an instru-
ment for decision-making or a negotiating
tactic to lead to agreement, but an inte-
gral part of the process of creating a shared
vision among a diverse group of stake-
holders. Getting the right answer is not
as important as having stakeholders accept
whatever solution emerges (11).
Collaboration can also be facilitated by
the emergence of a “collaborative capacity
builder” whose role is to ensure the inte-
gration of knowledge among stakeholders
as part of a long-term strategy to fos-
ter a collaborative environment for con-
tinuously addressing the dilemmas posed
by dual-use research. An individual or
organization is empowered to play the
role of collaborative capacity builder due
to its legal authority, expertise valued by
other stakeholders, reputation as an hon-
est broker, or some combination of these
values (10).
Recognizing that a problem is wicked
is the first step to coping with the prob-
lem. Viewing dual-use research as a wicked
problem highlights the need for stakehold-
ers to engage in dialog with one another
and to adopt collaborative strategies for
managing risks in this area. Admitting that
the experts do not have all of the answers
and giving up the zero-sum view that dom-
inates policy-making in a pluralistic society
will be difficult, but the potential benefits
of seeking collaborative solutions is well
worth the discomfort caused by this mode
of problem-solving.
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